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 gabriel harvey has long been remembered for his connections rather than
his writings. He chose wisely in making a friend of Edmund Spenser in the 1570s and
unwisely in making an enemy of Thomas Nashe in the 1590s. His reputation has been
permanently marked by the clumsy provocation he offered to Nashe and the dexterity
with which he was turned aside. In comparison to Nashe’s writings, Harvey’s literary
accomplishments appear of slight consequence: experimental poetry in Latin and
English, and letters and satirical prose. Most of his publications have been forgotten,
but he is valued from an antiquarian point of view as a collector and annotator of
books. Indeed, his industrious habit of annotation inspired an edition of selected mar-
ginalia by G. C. Moore-Smith in 1913 and a study of his life and library by Virginia Stern
in 1979.1
Harvey’s reputation has been rehabilitated, if not quite restored, however, by a
new and burgeoning field of research, the history of the book, and within this the his-
tory of reading. Here, the marginal Harvey has played a surprisingly central role. In
1990, Lisa Jardine and Anthony Grafton, working with a copy of Livy’s Decades owned
by Harvey, demonstrated the purpose and method of humanist reading practice as
professional, collaborative, and “goal-orientated.” They discovered in the margins of
this text evidence of its “directed reading” with “prominent Elizabethan political fig-
ures.” Harvey recalls in marginal notes a private conference he had with Philip Sidney
about “‘these three books of Livy’” and, on a separate occasion, a debate at the house of
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Thomas Smith that apparently “emerged from or accompanied a full-scale reading of
the text.” Moreover, Jardine and Grafton have been able to connect these debates to
“real-life events.” Harvey’s reading of Livy with Sidney, they argue, probably took place
just before Sidney’s embassy to Rudolph II in 1577. They describe this reading as “‘moral
politique’”: “a careerist reading—one designed to promote the career of a courtier, and
at the same time to bring the hopeful facilitator to the notice of a court circle.”2
Although there have been a few attempts to move beyond this model of “goal-
orientated” reading, Jardine and Grafton’s account of Harvey’s practice remains intact,
for all sorts of good reasons.3 One is that this model is based on the reading practices
instilled by a humanist education. Under the guidance of a schoolmaster, young boys
learned Latin and studied rhetoric by “digesting” their books, noting stylistic devices
but also excerpting and collecting proverbs, maxims, pithy sayings, and ready-made
phrases that they stored in their “commonplace books” under headings (“places”). The
purpose of this practice was to facilitate the easy retrieval of linguistic resources and
information to aid composition. It is this habit from elementary schooling that in-
formed professional reading: what Grafton has elsewhere described as the “process-
ing” of the ancients for patrons, princes, noblemen, clerics, their transformation “into
uniform, easily retrievable, reproducible bits of utterance and information.”4 It is also
this habit that is represented and developed in the margins of the adversaria, a collec-
tion of annotated early modern books held in Cambridge University Library. William
H. Sherman, who recently brought fresh attention to these, observes that they share a
range of annotational techniques that facilitate the quick retrieval of information:
underlining, topical headings, cross-references, summaries, and diagrams.5
A second very good reason for accepting this model is that it has helped us
under stand better the political values of humanists. Searching books for phrases 
and stylistic devices and leaving markers in book margins is understood to shape 
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3. For new emphases in the history of reading, see Heidi Brayman Hackel, Reading Material in
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4. Anthony Grafton, “The Humanist as Reader,” in Guglielmo Cavallo and Roger Chartier, eds., 
A History of Reading in the West, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Cambridge, 1999), 179–212 at 199. 
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(Amherst, Mass., 1995), 65–75. On the adversaria, see also David McKitterick, Cambridge University 
Library: A History (Cambridge, 1986). For a study of the use of the “manicule,” or marginal hand, to 
select, among other things, sententiae for recording in commonplace books, see William H. Sherman,
“Toward a History of the Manicule,” http://www.livesandletters.ac.uk, posted March 2005, accessed
5 January 2007. 
readers who are skilled in “the manipulation of information”6 and who, in some 
cases, are “ruthlessly utilitarian” in their social as well as their literary practice. Thus, 
Kevin Sharpe, who develops Jardine and Grafton’s model of Harvey’s practice for the
seventeenth-century diarist William Drake, discovers a correlation between Drake’s
habit of breaking up a text, extracting what was immediately useful, and his equally
pragmatic attitude toward his associates. “All social relationships,” writes Sharpe, like
the books that Drake avidly digested, “were pursued for gain.”7
Challenging this influential model may seem churlish, not least because it
might withdraw from Harvey the little credit he has regained. Yet his surprising promi-
nence in this area of book history has obscured one oddity or contradiction: the curi-
ous mismatch between the Harvey we have come to know from his marginalia and the
Harvey we might get to know from his poetry and prose writings. Attention to the lat-
ter may well prompt us to modify our conception of Harvey’s pragmatic humanism.
For example, in his familiar letters to Spenser, printed in 1580, Harvey sought to repre-
sent a more flexible relationship between a teacher and a talented student, and between
friends at different stages in their careers, than had been envisaged by earlier human-
ists. This is a different kind of “collaboration and conversation”8 from the one discov-
ered by Jardine and Grafton in the margins of humanist books. In these letters they are
not just displaying their ability to advise and direct; they are also making a case for
reading as an active and critical activity, one that empowers the student.9
This is not to say that Harvey is not pragmatic or self-interested in these letters.
Throughout he also advertises his skill as a professional reader, noting in one letter
that he has been reading Homer and Virgil “this fortnight” with his Lord for the lat-
ter’s “preferment,” and then boasts that “I dare undertake he shall not neede any fur-
ther instruction.”10 More ambitiously still, these letters establish Gabriel Harvey as a
successor to an earlier generation of Cambridge humanists. They do so in a curious
way, however, by dwelling on Harvey’s refusal to teach. “I dare geue no Preceptes,
nor set downe any Certaine General Arte,” Harvey stubbornly declares in response to
Spenser’s request for advice, adding that he is “not greatly squaimishe of my Particular
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scribed as the manipulation of information—in selecting, ordering and applying resources gleaned
from a wide variety of texts” (p. 4).
7. Sharpe, Reading Revolutions: The Politics of Reading in Early Modern England (New Haven,
Conn., 2000), 84–85, 99. See also Sharpe, “Uncommonplaces? Sir William Drake’s Reading Notes,” in
Sabrina Alcorn Baron, ed., The Reader Revealed (Seattle and London, 2001), 59–65. 
8. Anthony Grafton, “Is the History of Reading a Marginal Enterprise? Guillaume Budé and His
Books,” Publication of the Bibliographical Society of America 91 (1997): 139–57 at 152.
9. Gabriel Harvey and Edmund Spenser, Three Proper, and wittie, familiar Letters: lately passed
between two Universitie men: touching the Earthquake in Aprill last, and our English refourmed Versify-
ing. Two Other very commendable Letters, of the same mens writing: both touching the foresaid Artificiall
Versifying, and certain other Particulars (London, 1580). For discussion of this, see Jennifer Richards,
Rhetoric and Courtliness in Early Modern Literature (Cambridge, 2003), chap. 5, esp. 122–38.
10. Harvey and Spenser, Three Proper, and wittie, familiar Letters, sigs. E3r–E4r, H4v. References
are given henceforward in the text.
Examples,” and so offers his own poems for discussion. He “that can but reasonably skil
of the one,” the poetry, he insists, “wil give easily a shreude gesse at the other,” the 
rules, “considering that the one fetcheth his original and offspring from the other”
(sigs. D4v–E1r). In so doing, he rejects the “dead Advertizement” (sig. D4r) of Roger
Ascham’s The Scholemaster (1570): its strict regard for the authority of classical “quan-
tification,” the system that measures the “quantity” or duration of a syllable according
to Greek or Latin pronunciation, and its application to English. If poets want rules,
Harvey argues, they need to develop them through practice—that is, through experi-
mentation and in debate with other poets. This is just what he and Spenser do in these
letters; they exchange early drafts of poems and offer critical commentary. They are
discriminating and challenging readers of each other’s work. 
To be blunt, though: why should this matter? It may simply disentangle another,
and not unexpected, strand of opinion in the temperament of this essentially minor and
eccentric Tudor humanist. Yet, Harvey’s commitment to the principle and practice of
dialogue in his prose writing11 might invite us to vary our sense of the goals of this early
modern reader and to think more expansively about how we interpret marginalia—a
different kind of dialogue or “speaking across”12—as a moral-political form. I want to
venture such an approach here by making this claim: that an adversarial reading, or its
imaginative representation at least, could explore the restraining of authority as well as
the promotion of individual careers. I will explore this argument in relation to Harvey’s
annotation of James VI’s Essayes of a Prentise, in the Divine Art of Poesie (Edinburgh,
1584), a reading that relates closely to the concerns of his letters to Spenser.13 The book
is a volume of poetry that he says he read hot off the press on 24 February 1585. I should
confess now that I will be straying quite widely from Harvey’s specific response to this
work, which demands an understanding of his reading method that is broader than
that proposed by Jardine and Grafton. I will be considering, among other things,
Harvey’s neglected formulation of his reading practice, as articulated in his Cambridge
lectures on the art of rhetoric, published in 1577 as Rhetor. These lectures not only illus-
trate once again Harvey’s reluctance to tolerate the unchallenged enforcement of lin-
guistic laws, but they also detail a way of reading that, I am claiming, is put into practice
in Essayes. First, though, I want to introduce James VI’s Essayes of a Prentise and Har-
vey’s reading of it, and I also want to give a more overtly political turn to Harvey’s pre-
occupation with rule-making and -breaking. 
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11. For further evidence of Harvey’s experimentation with the dialogue form, see also Letter-Book
of Gabriel Harvey a.d. 1573–1580, ed. Edward John Long Scott (London, 1884).
12. On marginalia as “conversations,” see Jackson, Marginalia, 82–86.
13. Harvey’s copy, held in Magdalene College, Cambridge, is bound with James VI’s His Maiesties
Poeticall Exercises at vacant houres (Edinburgh, 1591) and Josuah Sylvester’s translation of Guillaume
de Salluste Du Bartas’s writings, The Triumph of Faith. The Sacrifice of Isaac, the Ship-wracke of Ionas.
with a song of the victories obtained by the French King, at Yvry (London, 1592). For Harvey’s dated 
signature, see sig. P4v. Sig. A3r is also signed “Gabriel Harvey. 1585.” His signature also appears on the
title page of The Triumph of Faith (undated).
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James’s Essayes of a Prentise is a collection of original poems accompanied by a transla-
tion of Du Bartas’s Vranie and, most importantly for my argument, a short prose piece
entitled “Revlis and cautelis [Rules and directions] to be obseruit and eschewit in Scot-
tis Poesie.”14 Despite the stature of the treatise’s author, one would be forgiven for sup-
posing that Harvey is interested in it only as an aspiring vernacular poet and, of course,
as a fellow pedant. Like other “scholars of his day,” Harvey corrects “scribal and typo-
graphical blunders” as he reads;15 his marginal annotation consists of a number of
corrections, usually added commas. He also inserts a handful of his own vernacular
and Latin poems, among them two “nursery rhymes,” “A charme for a mad woman,”
and “De republica ordinanda” [On the republic to be established], as well as scattered
comments, including praise of James VI as “A perfect Oratour, & diuine Poet” 
(sig. A3r). This is hardly “oppositional” reading. Compare this with the marginalia and
editorial interventions of James VI and I’s openly partisan readers in the seventeenth
century, especially those who remained undaunted by apparently obvious textual con-
straints. I am thinking of those readers who discovered in James VI and I’s Basilikon
Doron sympathy for “Anabaptism,” or the printers responsible for the unauthorized
editions of his Letter and Directions Touching Preaching and Preachers (1622), who
“succeeded in transforming a repressive text into a vehicle for expressing popular
thought and sentiment.”16
Moreover, unlike Harvey’s copy of Livy’s Decades, this book bears in its margins
no hint of a reading context, and no record of shared discussions about its contents.
Yet, names of friends and acquaintances do appear, and this may offer some insight
into the identity of the readers with whom Harvey shared this book. Harvey notes on
the title page that he bought Essayes with money given to him by Bartholomew Clerke
(d. 1590),17 and he dedicates a cryptic “horoscope” of five lines of iambic pentameter to
a second acquaintance. This poem is titled, “The victorie presaged to One, borne upon
New Yeares euen”; Harvey recalls that it was “Imparted at Occasion to, Doctor Bing,
master of Clare Hall: as judicious, as anie Doctor of his, or other profession”:
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14. These texts were annotated by Harvey in his neat italic hand across a period of ten years,
though it is Essayes that receives the most attention. For a full transcription of Harvey’s marginalia, see
Eleanor Relle, “Some New Marginalia and Poems of Gabriel Harvey,” The Review of English Studies 23
(1972): 401–16.
15. Grafton describes Guillaume Budé’s reading habits thus in “Is the History of Reading a Marginal
Enterprise?” 150.
16. James Doelman, “‘A King of Thine Own heart’: The English Reception of King James VI and I’s
Basilikon Doron,” Seventeenth Century 9 (1994): 1–9; Joseph Marshall, “Reading and Misreading King
James 1622–42: Responses to the Letter and Directions Touching Preaching and Preachers,” in Daniel
Fischlin and Mark Fortier, eds., Royal Subjects: Essays on the Writings of James VI and I (Detroit, 2002),
476–511 at 502. On the “polemical reading” of texts in the seventeenth century, see Steven Zwicker,
“Reading the Margins: Politics and the Habits of Appropriation,” in Kevin Sharpe and Steven Zwicker,
eds., Refiguring Revolutions: Aesthetics and Politics from the English Revolution to the Romantic Revolu-
tion (Berkeley, Calif., 1998), 101–15.
17. James VI, Essayes of a Prentise, in the Divine Art of Poesie (Edinburgh, 1584), sig. A3r.
The Capricornist capere in the roofe
Of the celestial palace; and surmountes
His adversaries in the heavens accounts.
Courage, mie hart: the victorie is thine:
Jove, & the Sun upon thie encounters shine. 
(Sig. G1r)
This is Thomas Byng (d. 1599), Master of Clare College and, like Clerke, a civil lawyer.18
Other names that appear include those of Philip Sidney (d. 1586), whose writing is
commended for its Homeric “pictorial quality” and, perhaps most importantly,
George Gascoigne (d. 1577), whose attempt to define the rules of English verse, Cer-
tayne notes of Instruction (1575), was known to both Harvey and James VI. But none of
this suggests that Harvey was reading Essayes “politically.” Except that he is, and to rec-
ognize this we need to expand our sense of his political idiom.
To make my case I want to step aside from Gascoigne and other poetry-makers
for a moment and suggest that Harvey’s other influence and interlocutor in his reading
of Essayes derives from a more remote but also more obviously political source: the
works of George Buchanan, especially his polemical treatise De iure regni apud Scotos
[The law of kingship among the Scots]. Harvey almost certainly knew this work. 
De iure was circulated among the so-called Sidney circle, to which Harvey was at-
tached; it was distributed first in manuscript in the mid-1570s, and later in print, pub-
lished in Edinburgh in 1579. Moreover, one of the members of this group, Daniel
Rogers, was responsible for the printing of the London edition in 1580.19 How this con-
nection might have informed Harvey’s reading of James VI’s poetry is not immediately
clear. This is partly because of our understanding of the significance of De iure: its hard-
line argument that not only must a king obey the law but also that it is lawful to kill a
king who does not. James VI’s Essayes—his first print publication—has been read as a
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18. Clerke (ca. 1537–1590) studied at King’s College, Cambridge, obtaining his B.A. in 1559; he was
appointed Professor of Rhetoric ca. 1563, proceeding to the L.L.D in 1572. Byng (d. 1599) was admitted
to Peterhouse as a sizar in 1552 and took his B.A. in 1555/6 and his M.A. in 1559; he became Public Ora-
tor in 1565, and later proceeded to the L.L.D in 1570. He was elected Master of Clare College in 1571. In
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sor of Civil Law at Cambridge. A third friend, John Caius (1510–1573), is the Cambridge scholar and
physician who refounded Gonville College in 1557. These associates were also committed to the explo-
ration and practice of civil conversation: both Caius and Byng published their support for Clerke’s Latin
translation of Castiglione’s Il libro del cortegiano (1571). See the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 
19. See James E. Phillips’s excellent and underused essay, “George Buchanan and the Sidney Circle,”
Huntington Library Quarterly 12 (1948–49): 23–55. Copies of a manuscript of De iure, and later the
newly printed edition, were circulated among this circle; notably, Daniel Rogers lent his copy to
Thomas Wilson, who shared it with Thomas Bromley, who then passed it on to William Cecil (who,
Rogers complained, failed to return it). See also the introduction to George Buchanan, A Dialogue on
the Law of Kingship among the Scots: A Critical Edition and Translation of George Buchanan’s “De Iure
Regni apud Scotos Dialogus,” ed. and trans. Roger A. Mason and Martin S. Smith (Aldershot, U.K.,
2004), xli–xlii. For Harvey’s admiration of Buchanan’s astronomical and religious poetry, and his 
interest in Buchanan’s three invectives against Mary, Queen of Scots (1571), see Phillips, “George
Buchanan,” 47–49. On Harvey’s ownership of these invectives, see Stern, Gabriel Harvey, 204–5, 
and Harvey, Gabriel Harvey’s Marginalia, 158.
sharp rejoinder to this. Rebecca Bushnell argues persuasively that James is asserting
in Essayes his divinely bestowed status “as the reformer of Scottish culture and the
‘inventor’ of its laws.” Indeed, in laying down the “reulis” of poetry, the king seems to
be “working out a sense of himself as a ‘free’ lawmaker and a Scot, in ways which
would surface more clearly in his later political works,” most notably Trew Law of Free 
Monarchies (1598), which defends his right to modify the law.20 Given this argument,
Harvey’s praise of James VI, cited above, seems rather too accommodating for a com-
mitted reader of Buchanan: it seems that he is accepting too readily the divine author-
ity of a king to declare laws. 
But what if we approach Buchanan differently, focusing less on our sense of
De iure as the quotable work of a “radical monarchomach”21 who gave his young
charge nightmares with “terrifying stories of what had happened to wicked kings,”22
and turn our attention instead to the significance of its dialogue form? Why would
Buchanan have chosen this literary form to explore the law of kingship among the
Scots? One reason is that it helps to elucidate his broader conception of the law. For
Buchanan the law is not only a rule or code that should be followed. Following Cicero
in De legibus [On the laws], he understands the law as a set of practices or customs that
carry the consent of a community (including, in Scotland, the view that a king is sub-
ject to the law). Just as importantly, though, he also understands it as an internal re-
source, our capacity for reason and speech; it is this divinely bestowed gift, the origins
of our humanity, that enables us to form social relationships, to form societies.23 The
one conception of the law sustains the other: laws agreed upon across the generations
should realize and protect this capacity for fellowship, which is synonymous with nat-
ural law. For this reason, Cicero insists that in order to comprehend a just and civil so-
ciety we must first explore the divine origins of human nature, rather than the codified
regulations of a state. That is, we must first grasp “that there is only one principle by
which men may live together with one another and that this is the same for all, and 
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20. Rebecca Bushnell, “George Buchanan, James VI, and Neo-classicism,” in Roger A. Mason, ed.,
Scots and Britons: Scottish Political Thought and the Union of 1603 (Cambridge, 1994), 91–111 at 91, 106.
This stance seems to be supported by the attack on jealous counselors in Phoenix and also by the defer-
ential prefatory sonnets of James VI’s court poets; these represent him in the style of a Roman emperor
and divine author who defies comparison. Essayes is often seen to construct the reader as subject to an
absolutist king; see Jonathan Goldberg, James I and the Politics of Literature: Jonson, Shakespeare,
Donne, and their Contemporaries (Baltimore, 1983), and Kevin Sharpe and Peter Lake, eds., Culture
and Politics in Early Stuart England (Basingstoke, U.K., 1994). For a different view of the way in which
James’s poetic career is implicated in the politics of the Scottish court, see Roderick J. Lyall, “James VI
and the Sixteenth-Century Cultural Crisis,” in Julian Goodare and Michael Lynch, eds., The Reign of
James VI (East Linton, U.K., 2000), 55–70 at 59.
21. Roger A. Mason, “Rex Stoicus: George Buchanan, James VI, and the Scottish Polity,” in 
John Dwyer, Roger A. Mason, and Alexander Murdoch, eds., New Perspectives on the Politics and 
Culture of Early Modern Scotland (Edinburgh, 1982), 9.
22. Jenny Wormald, “James VI and I, Basilikon Doron, and The Trew Law of Free Monarchies:
The Scottish Context and the English Translation,” in Linda Levy Peck, ed., The Mental World of the 
Jacobean Court (Cambridge, 1991), 36–54 at 43.
23. Buchanan, Law of Kingship, 17. On the divine (divinus) source of human rationality see Cicero,
De legibus, 1.22–24, in De Republica, De Legibus, trans. Clinton Walker Keyes (Cambridge, Mass., and
London, 1977). 
possessed equally by all”; the principle is “that all men are bound together by a certain
natural feeling of good-will.”24 The core of civilized life is defined as an ethic of civil as-
sociation; this demands intercommunication and mutual respect among citizens. 
Buchanan’s debate about law-making is greatly indebted to Cicero’s De legibus.
The speaker given Buchanan’s name in the dialogue argues that natural law is of “divine
origin” and defines “nature” thus: as “a light divinely shed upon our minds” [lucem ani-
mis nostris divinitus infusam] (pp. 18–19). Moreover, his understanding of the relation-
ship between natural law and positive law informs De iure’s dignified definition of the
duty a king owes to his people as participation in dialogue, not simply enforcing sub-
mission to a set of inflexible laws: only a king who engages in dialogue with his par-
liament can truly be called “divine.” This explains Buchanan’s choice of the dialogue
form for De iure: the exchange that he represents between the speakers manifests the
process of reasoning that fulfills or realizes this law; it brings the king into conversation
with his parliament.
Bushnell, in a very suggestive reading, contends that James VI’s Essayes offers a
sharp riposte to Buchanan’s hard-line insistence that the king is subject to the law. She
benefits from hindsight, however, making this argument with an eye to James VI’s later
print publications, notably Trew Law. In 1584 a reader familiar with the moral-political
basis of Buchanan’s De iure might just as easily have arrived at a different view of 
Essayes and its defense of linguistic custom: that James VI promised to prove a “‘citizen
king,’”25 one amenable to the collective shaping of laws. In Harvey’s case, such a read-
ing may have been encouraged not just because of his literary tastes—his commitment
to the organic realization of the rules of vernacular poetry, outlined in his letters to
Spenser—but also because it was impossible to imagine that Buchanan, who was ap-
pointed as James VI’s tutor in 1570, had not shaped the king’s values. There was an un-
derstanding among the Sidney circle that Buchanan had reared Elizabeth I’s likely
successor “in accordance with the political doctrines of limited monarchy and popular
sovereignty.”26 This interpretation is reflected, not negated, by Harvey’s praise of the
king as “A perfect Oratour, & diuine Poet.” After all, this praise is accompanied by a
Latin tag, “Magna grauiter: Mediocria temperatè: parua submissè” [most gravely, with
moderation, a little modestly], and it follows a conventional expression of self-
deprecation by the king in a poem entitled “Ane Qvadrain of Alexandrin Verse”:
Immortal Gods, sen I with pen and Poets airt
So willingly hes servde you, though my skill be small,
I pray then euerie one of you to help his pairt,
In graunting this my sute, which after follow shall. 
(Sig. A3r)
Quite simply, James is divine not just because he is eloquent but also because he knows
his limits.27
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24. Cicero, De legibus, 1.35.
25. See the introduction to Buchanan, Law of Kingship, xxxix.
26. Phillips, “George Buchanan,” 36–37.
27. On the complex use of this word in the English parliament see Conrad Russell, “Divine Rights
in the Early Seventeenth Century,” in John Morrill, Paul Slack, and Daniel Woolf, eds., Public Duty and
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It is one thing to recognize how a Roman ethos of civil association is formulated in 
the work of a political theorist like Buchanan, quite another to argue that it consti-
tutes the basis for a reading of a book of poems. How can the act of annotating such a
book be construed as an example of this ethos? How can reading poetry serve to realize
the “sacred bond of fellowship” that is the first principle of natural law? There is an
important link, I am suggesting, between the debate about lawmaking in Buchanan’s
De iure and the one about the rules of poetry in “Revlis and cautelis,” at least in my ac-
count of Harvey’s reading of Essayes: both texts understand that the formulation, ei-
ther of a principle or a regulation, is a process of negotiation; laws and rules must be
established from practice and through discussion and debate. This link depends on
understanding the reading of Essayes as an imaginative, if one-sided, dialogue with its
author, and the value of the book as resting on its contribution to an ongoing exchange
about the laws of vernacular poetry rather than as a resource than can be turned “into
uniform, easily retrievable, reproducible bits of utterance and information.”28
Fortunately, we do not have to intuit or deduce this simply from Harvey’s mar-
ginalia or from specific moments of its practice, because he defends the importance of
conversation to reading in Rhetor (1577). I want to pause over these lectures before
turning to Harvey’s copy of Essayes because they offer us a different way of under-
standing how training in rhetoric—another rule-bound art—shaped humanist read-
ing methods, and thus a different paradigm for the reading of Essayes. In these lectures,
Harvey understands reading as “goal-orientated” in a specific sense: the kind of
rhetorical analysis and practice that, he advises, will create a reader who nurtures “the
light of divine nature” [naturae diuinae lumen] or eloquence through reading, writing,
and conversing. This method prioritizes practice over the solitary and docile study of
rules as a means to realize this “divine light.”29
For Harvey, schooled by Cicero, eloquence connotes fluent and moving speech
and writing, but it is also a social virtue, and its acquisition depends on more than
learning a set of devices by heart. Rather like Cicero in De oratore [On the ideal orator],
Harvey rejects the emphasis on technical training.30 Rhetor includes an attack on 
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Private Conscience in Seventeenth-Century England: Essays Presented to G. E. Aylmer (Oxford, 1993),
101–20 at 111. Russell reminds us that the adjective “divine” could be used to “limit” or “increase” the
sovereign’s power. For a common lawyer, it was possible that the common law—which is not made but
grows organically—“was equally derived from God, and that the divine right of the king and the divine
right of the common law, like the Lords and Commons, had to learn to live with each other.”
28. Grafton, “The Humanist as Reader,” 199. Important challenges to the perceived relationship
between rhetoric and reading include Peter Mack’s “Rhetoric, Ethics, and Reading in the Renaissance,”
and, very recently, Daniel Wakelin’s Humanism, Reading, and English Literature 1430–1530
(Oxford, 2007).
29. Gabriel Harvey’s Rhetor, trans. Mark Reynolds, http:comp.uark.edu$mreynold/rhetor.html,
accessed 5 January 2007, p. 33; page references are given henceforward in the text. On the importance
of practice to Harvey, see John Charles Adams, “Gabriel Harvey’s Ciceronianus and the Place of Peter
Ramus’ Dialecticae libri duo in the Curriculum,” Renaissance Quarterly 43 (1990): 551–64 at 561; see
also Timothy J. Reiss, Knowledge, Discovery, and Imagination in Early Modern Europe: The Rise of 
Aesthetic Rationalism (Cambridge, 1997), chap. 3.
30. Cicero’s De oratore [On the ideal orator] is a key source for Rhetor. In this dialogue the main
speakers refuse to divulge the rules of their art straightforwardly, arguing that the principles of 
classroom textbooks that, according to Harvey, crush the “light of divine nature” with
their long lists of figures (p. 33). He explains that a student needs only to memorize one
style manual, Omer Talon’s very succinct Rhetorica (p. 34), and that he should read as
widely as possible among the best (Roman) orators and poets and look for examples
that elucidate the rules he has already picked up. Harvey offers precise advice on what
students should be looking for when reading. They should analyze the style of poets
and orators, paying attention to their brilliant tropes, “the vigor and bite of their
thought,” and the “arrangement and fluency and cohesiveness and composition” of
their “whole discourse”; moreover, they should highlight for future reference “all those
passages which are ornamental, elaborate, and highly polished.” More broadly, they
should also: 
compare [their] findings with a carefully formulated artistic theory. Illus-
trate the rules with examples, and fit the examples to the rules. Observe
how these rules were in the beginning formulated by generalizing from
individual examples. (P. 91)
All of this falls under the heading of what is described as “analysis.” However, as Har-
vey also explains, analysis is only one aspect of the “practice” (exercitatio) that leads to
eloquence. Its second aspect is “genesis,” and this includes a range of activities—
writing, reading, and “speaking, pleading and declaiming” (p. 99). 
This may sound very much like the rhetorical training with which we are al-
ready familiar, but I want to pause over two new emphases in Rhetor: the importance
of matching examples to rules so as to understand how these rules have been formu-
lated from practice, and of practicing them in reading, writing, and speaking. More-
over, Harvey understands “genesis” very broadly: all kinds of speech, not just exercises
in declamation, provide occasion for “genesis.” One of the divine orators praised by
Harvey, and more famously by Cicero, is Socrates: the philosopher who learned how to
be eloquent by “reading, praising, criticizing, correcting, refuting, and irritating” the
best rhetoricians and by joining “in discussions, disputes, and dialogues” (pp. 75–76).31
The obvious aim of Rhetor is to reform rhetorical training by describing a num-
ber of “practical” and adversarial exercises that nurture eloquence; but a second aim—
we could say, a by-product—of this is the reconception of the nature of the relationship
between tutor and student. This concern is represented in the aspirations of Harvey’s
new rhetorical curriculum to establish a less-hierarchical relationship between stu-
dent and teacher. From the beginning of the first lecture Harvey claims not to be teach-
ing anything new: “you will hear only those precepts which you yourselves followed
some years ago” (p. 6). This is not false modesty. Harvey locates authority not in a rule-
bound pedagogy but in the shifting dialogue between a pupil and teacher as they test
the established rules. Recognition of the student’s potential levels this relationship: the
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teacher must exercise restraint, working out the rules with his student rather than just
pronouncing them. Thus, Harvey recalls with approval Cicero’s observation that
“‘Many students are greater than their teachers’” (p. 20); later, he advises that students
should learn from example rather than from instruction (p. 113). The model of learning
that Rhetor favors is competitive in spirit. The student is frequently encouraged to
outdo exemplary poets and orators. “Match them,” Harvey urges, “and sometimes
even surpass them in refined and elegant stylistic charms, in smooth, flowing periods,
and in tasteful repetitions of the same words and sounds” (p. 100). This model, how-
ever, is also friendly and collaborative. From the very beginning of Rhetor Harvey in-
sists on the mutual creation of excellence. The prefatory material commends reading
the works of colleagues because this supports them and lends authority to their writ-
ings. In the dedication to Clerke, Harvey praises John Caius and Thomas Byng as “elo-
quent gentlemen” (p. i). Clerke’s response is printed alongside this. He agrees with
Harvey, but he also advises him “earnestly” to “visit my Byng, and yours too, a man of
most precise judgment.” Harvey is encouraged to share drafts of his writings with
Byng, who will extol them but also “by his sound judgment and appraisal will refine
them, in such a way that even if they should have no need of correction and more ex-
acting criticism they might even seem to you to have taken on an added excellence
from his very touch and gaze.” Clerke recounts a salutary tale of the loneliness of his
own early writing career, and then offers advice that, as we have seen, Harvey repeats in
the lectures:
Nothing causes me greater grief than that I studied alone, read alone,
wrote alone, and published my books alone. It is very important to have
someone to whom you can communicate your thoughts, and to hear the
advice of another, even one who is perhaps less wise than you. (P. v)
There are several interesting correlations between Rhetor and Harvey’s reading
of Essayes. The Cambridge humanists Clerke and Byng, who are identified as exem-
plary orators and readers at the beginning of Rhetor, also appear briefly in the margins
of Essayes, suggesting that they may have been the intended recipients. Moreover,
James VI’s treatise is judged according to the criterion commended in Rhetor, econ-
omy. Harvey was sufficiently impressed by the succinctness of “Revlis and cautelis” to
make a note of this on its first page: “8. leaves. short, & sweet” (sig. L1r). At the bottom
of the same page he inserts a reference to George Sabinus’s rhetorical handbook De
Carminibus ad verterum imitationem artificiose componendis, praecepta bona & utilia,
well known for its brevity, and on the preceding blank page details several of its rules
(sig. K4r). This preference for immediacy is also the subject of one of Harvey’s two
Latin poems, “Odiosa Procrastinatio. ad Meipsum,” a reminder to avoid procrastina-
tion, which rings with the refrain: skill is too late tomorrow; learn now! [tarda nimis
techna est crastina: disce statim; sig. P2v]. In addition, we might note how easily debate
about the rules of rhetoric carries over to a treatise on the art of poetry. However, if in
Rhetor Harvey is concerned with how “practice” facilitates a deep understanding of the
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art of rhetoric, when reading Essayes he is interested instead in how it helps to formu-
late the rules of poetry. In the final section of this essay I want to argue that Harvey’s
“analysis” and “genesis” of the king’s rules in Essayes should be conceived as part of a
process of reform, the gradual articulation of the laws of poetry rather than their obe-
dient acceptance; this, in turn, is imagined as a way of supporting a “‘citizen-king’”
who understands the importance of the collective production of laws.

Jenny Wormald has described how the “agony over union” at the turn of the seven-
teenth century gave rise to the “English fear of James as the divine-right monarch who
made awesome claims for himself which broke all accepted English rules and conven-
tions.”32 Some were concerned that the King of Scots did not understand English
common law, the law that was deemed to reflect “a morality based on divine law” and
that carried the consent of the commonwealth because it had acquired its authority
through the legal practice and deep discussion by generations of lawyers.33 Indeed, it
was feared that James adhered too closely to the Roman or civil law, “which followed
the princes pleasure.” He is reported to have hanged a thief without trial at Newark-on-
Trent on his progress south in 1603, leaving one Elizabethan courtier, Sir John Har-
rington, to speculate thus: “oure new King hath hanged one man before he was tried;
’tis strangely done: now if the winde bloweth thus, why may not a man be tried before
he hath offended?”34
Such concerns were likely fueled by James’s clear indication in print that he be-
lieved his Scottish subjects owed “unstinting obedience to their divinely appointed
ruler” according to the law of God.35 The Trew Law of Free Monarchies (1598) is under-
stood as a riposte to the radical Presbyterian divine Andrew Melville and also the re-
publican Buchanan. James, to defend his divine right, notes Roger Mason, provided in
Trew Law both scriptural exegesis and an interpretation of “the famous Ciceronian
dictum summum jus summum injuria [more law, less justice], in terms that would have
appalled Buchanan, as an open invitation to modify or dispense with the law as he saw
fit.”36 This worry might also have been fueled by his early formulation of the rules of
Scottish poetry. As I have noted, Rebecca Bushnell describes Essayes as James VI’s
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sharp rejoinder to his erstwhile tutor, Buchanan. We might suppose that James’s deci-
sion to include a brief manual titled “Revlis and cautelis” in a collection of his own
verse is provocative; it does suggest that the king is asserting his divinely bestowed sta-
tus “as the reformer of Scottish culture and the ‘inventor’ of its laws.” And this may
explain “the gentle advice,” as Gavin Alexander phrases it, that Samuel Daniel offers
his new monarch in 1603 in Defence of Rhyme “about the attachment of the freeborn
English to their ancient rights.”37 Using the language of natural and common law, 
Defence of Rhyme attacks the “unjust authority of the law-giver” who turns decent Eng-
lish words into disobedient and unruly citizens by forcing them to follow foreign (neo-
classical) patterns.38 “Every language,” Daniel writes, “hath her proper number or
measure fitted to use and delight, which custom, entertaining by the allowance of the
ear, doth indenize and make natural” (p. 210). Custom naturalizes new words, but it
also derives in turn from what is natural or fitting to a particular language. For this rea-
son Daniel unambiguously asserts that accentual iambic pentameter is the natural
meter of English, arguing that attention to the “sound” of a language represents a natu-
ral and demotic alternative to the tyrannical prescription of new rules applied from
other languages. James VI and I evidently needs reminding of this.
But this is 1603. Readers of James VI’s Essayes in the 1580s could have found a
different emphasis, one that was much more congenial to the concerns of Daniel and
other defenders of vernacular custom. This is because James is committed to the recov-
ery of the customs of Scots poetry and argues that this means paying attention to how
the vernacular sounds in practice. In the preface to “Revlis and cautelis” he explains
why he has undertaken this work: “albeit sindrie hes written of it in English, quhilk is
lykest to our language, zit we differ from thame in sindrie reulis of Poesie” (sig. K2v).
James VI’s attentiveness to the vernacular leads him to recommend the conventions of
Scots poetry—including rhetorical tropes such as alliteration and the native genre of
flyting; it also leads him to identify iambic meter as natural to it (sig. L2r). Poets should
be guided by the sound of courtly Scots, he insists: “gif ze wald ask me the reulis,
quhairby to knaw euerie ane of thir thre foirsaidis kyndis of syllabes,” he insists, “I an-
swer, Zour eare man be the onely iudge and discerner thairof.” And he offers proof of
this to his readers, asking them to identify which line flows better:
Into the Sea then Lucifer upsprang.
In the Sea then Lucifer to upsprang. 
(Sig. L2r)
We might add to this the “self-conscious modesty” of the king’s title, Essayes of a
Prentise.39 James is in fact a consistently self-deprecating author. Most of the examples
of his “reulis” are drawn from the court poet Alexander Montgomerie, and both Essayes
and His Maiesties Poeticall Exercises at vacant houres include translations from the
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Protestant reformer and French poet Du Bartas. In other words, James is not the only
author in Essayes. The so-called Castalian poets may preface Essayes with flattering
sonnets, but one member of this group, Thomas Hudson, in the preface to his transla-
tion of Du Bartas’s The Historie of Iudith (1584), offers insight into a different kind of di-
alogue between king and court poets. He undertook the translation as an assignment
from the king, with the aim of disproving his claim that Du Bartas could not be imi-
tated “in our rude and impollished english language.”40 This wish to improve poetry
by laying down a challenge to fellow poets is carried over to Essayes. In the preface to
his translation of Du Bartas’s Vranie, James apologizes for the lack of skill that has com-
pelled him to break some of his own rules: “I must also desire you to bear with it, albeit
it be replete with innumerable and intolerable faultes: sic as, Ryming in tearmes [poly-
syllabic words], and dyuers others, whilkis ar forbidden in my owne treatise of the Art
of Poësie” (sig. C3v). James may not outdo Du Bartas, but he hopes that “some quick
spirited man of this yle . . . might by the reading of it, bee moued to translate it well, and
best, where I haue both euill, and worst broyled it” (sig. C3v). We could say that Harvey
takes James at his word, for he does offer to tidy his translation. Du Bartas’s line start-
ing “Ce que la Cour celeste” appears in Essayes as “It that the heavenly court,” and is
clarified by Harvey thus: “That which [the heavenly court]” (sig. D3r).
James VI’s modesty may well explain why Harvey takes upon himself the role of
advising the king in the margins of Essayes, engaging with him in imaginative dialogue
about the formation of the rules of Scots verse, which is written in the language that is
“lykest” to English. But Harvey is already confirmed in the habit of contesting the rules
of poetic “theorists,” as his detailed annotation in 1577 of George Gascoigne’s Certayne
notes of Instruction (1575) suggests. That Harvey was interested in this text and anno-
tated it is unsurprising. Certayne notes offers a clear defense of linguistic custom
against a top-down prescription of rules almost three decades before Samuel Daniel,
and it probably informs the defense of linguistic custom that Harvey was to offer in
Three Proper, and wittie, familiar Letters in 1579–80. Gascoigne defends native customs
of rhyme and “accent,” and he emphasizes the importance of paying attention to pro-
nunciation. Thus, he offers to “set down . . . such rules or precepts that even in this plain
foot of two syllables [an iamb] you rest no word from his natural and usual sound.”
Poets should “place every worde in his natural Emphasis or sound”; to do otherwise, he
insists, is not “lawful or commendable.”41 Thus, establishing the rules of poetry de-
pends on the observation of practice: as Harvey writes in his letters to Spenser, he “that
can but reasonably skil of the one wil give easily a shreude gesse at the other, consider-
ing that the one fetcheth his original and offspring from the other” (sigs. D4v–E1r).
This perhaps explains why Harvey engages critically with Gascoigne, testing his rules
against examples, agreeing and sometimes disagreeing with him. When Gascoigne ar-
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gues that we should “place every worde in his Natural Emphasis,” Harvey agrees: “the
naturall and ordinary Empha[sis] of euery word as, uiolĕntly: not uiolēntly.” How-
ever, against Gascoigne’s own example, “Treasúre,” he writes: “as I haue heard sum
straungers and namely Frenchmen pronounce it. Treasúre. Sed ineptè.”42 He finds ex-
amples that confirm or contradict particular rules: thus Gascoigne prohibits writers
from placing an adjective after a noun, but Harvey notes, “yet we use to say He is of the
bludd royal, and not: he is of the roiall bludd. he is heire apparent to the Crowne, and
not he is apparent heire to the Crowne.” He also comments critically on the organiza-
tion of the manual:
His aptest partition had bene, into precepts of Inuention [and] Elocu-
tion. And the several rules of both, to be sorted & marshialled in their
proper places. He doth prettily well: but might easely haue dun much
better, both in the one, & in the other: especially by the direction of 
Horaces, & Aristotles Ars Poetica.43
Would Harvey really have engaged with the King of Scots in the same way that
he did with his countryman Gascoigne? There are two explicit references to Certayne
notes in “Revlis and cautelis,” both of which are in James VI’s favor: 
A braue art of Poetry, supra in the Vrany of Dubartas: & his owne Twelue
Sonets of diuine Inuocations. Hetherto no better of English meter, then
Gascoignes Rules, and the practis of owr excellentist Poets. (Sig. K1r)
The excellentest rules, & finest Art, that A King could learne, or teach, in
his Kingdom. The more remarkable, how worthy the pen, & industrie of
a King. How much better, then owr Gascoignes Notes of instruction for
Inglish Verse, & Ryme. (Sig. K3r)
Nonetheless, this is not evidence of straightforward flattery. James VI is preferred to
Gascoigne not just because he carries royal authority as a “free law-maker,” but also, I
suggest, because he gives better expression to the common laws of verse. Reminding
his readers of the precedent of Gascoigne in these marginalia allows Harvey to suppose
that “Revlis and cautelis” is a similar kind of treatise—that is, it upholds the organic re-
form of the vernacular. Indeed, it is also likely that Harvey had his copy of Gascoigne in
front of him when he read “Revlis and cautelis”; the same criticism on the organization
of the treatise is repeated in this book:
His aptest partition had bene, into precepts of Inuention. Elocution. in
tropes, the meter, & other figures (Sig. L1v) 
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That is, the same questioning practice Harvey applied to Certayne notes informs his
reading of Essayes, and I will give a few further examples of this. When James advises
poets in “Revlis and cautelis” not to open a poem with an image of the rising sun be-
cause “thir thingis are sa oft and dyuerslie writtin vpon”—that it will look like imita-
tion, not invention—Harvey disagrees:
No Imitation, but a singularitie in the right Poet: & either exquisite
Descriptions; or fine Preteritions, or suddaine Reticenties: nihil Vulgare
[nothing common or ordinary] (Sig. M2r)
Elsewhere, he enforces James’s own rules. For example, in “Revlis and cautelis” James
offers advice on where to place the “Sectioun,” or caesura (sigs. L1v–L2r), but several of
his own poems fail to comply. Thus, Harvey dutifully adds caesurae to James VI’s son-
nets. He also checks and corrects his iambic pentameter: the line “Of fertile Harvest in
the description trew” in one sonnet is regularized to “Of fertile Harvest, in the descrip-
tion trew” (sig. B1v).
Harvey is a questioning reader of “Revlis and cautelis”; he is unwilling to accept
James VI’s rules for Scots verse without testing them first against English linguistic
practice. In testing these rules he reveals the ways in which these related vernaculars,
Scots and English, can be regulated for poetic effect. This explains Harvey’s inclusion
of two nursery rhymes, examples of what James calls “cuttit” or broken verse:
When pucketts away, when shall we go play?
When the puckett is a sleap, then may wee go sow owr wheat.
My Dame hath in a hutch at home
A little Dog
With a Clog;
Hey dogs hey. 
(Sig. G1v)44
The principle of vernacular regulation also informs his attitude to James’s conception
of iambic pentameter as suitable for “Heich and graue” subjects and for “tragicall”
verse.45 Harvey boldly transcribes some of his own compositions onto blank pages,
not only the poem celebrating Thomas Byng, cited above, but also “A charme for a mad
woman.” This second insertion recalls the recommendation that, contrary to James’s
advice, iambic pentameter is also suitable for low subjects.
Ô heauenlie Medcin, Panacea high,
Restore this raging Wooman to her health,
More Worth then hugest Summes of worldlie wealth
Exceedingly more worth than anie Wealth.
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Ô Light of Grace, & Reason from the Skie,
Jlluminate her madd-conceited minde,
And Melancholie cease her Witts to blinde.
Cease fearful Melanchollie her Witts to blinde. 
(Sig. O3r)
In this poem Harvey tests and extends the king’s laws for rhyming iambic meter; at no
point does he ever just obey them. “Charme” uses iambic pentameter for a low subject:
the troubles of a mad woman. In this poem Harvey also adapts the meter; he changes
the opening stress pattern of every second line from an iamb to a spondee, and he in-
troduces a rhyme scheme not used by James: abbb, accc. In fact, Harvey treats James’s
“laws” as if they were flexible and open to adaptation. For example, the repetition of
“wealth” at the end of the first stanza, and then “blinde” at the end of the second, is a
type of pattern expressly forbidden by James. One of his first rules is “That ze ryme
nocht twyse in ane syllabe” (sig. L1r). 
Such corrections may look like the efforts of a pedantic Cambridge scholar, but I
am arguing that they rather represent a considered contribution to a humanist debate
about the cultivation of eloquence and the formation and sustaining of the bonds of
commonwealth. When Harvey corrects James VI in “Revlis and cautelis” he is putting
into practice the theory outlined in Rhetor; he is showing how the king’s “Sovrain
grace” can be developed by reading, praising, criticizing, and correcting him. In doing
so, he is not usurping the role of lawgiver. James is “not to be trained by the instruction
of others” (p. 113); Harvey is no pedagogue. Rather, it is by discovering the rules of ver-
nacular poetry “rationally,” in dialogue with other humanists, that the king can “teach
by his own example” (p. 113). James VI’s writing of Essayes is evidence enough to suggest
to Harvey a willingness to engage in dialogue.
These corrections can seem oblique, but Harvey’s copy of Essayes also includes
an explicit plea for participation in government in a Latin poem copied onto a blank
page, “On the republic to be established. To the highest magistrates of the palace, city
and provinces” (see the Appendix on page 321). Harvey claims that this poem recalls a
conversation about “public matters” at Caius College. It urges magistrates to learn
from the example of the past, when moderation was held in esteem. Very few can
survive unlimited power, he argues:
We can look after the body politic and lighten the burden of state if we di-
vide the cares of a community with the proper art; we need to remember
laws, customs and rules. In this way, leaders will not be exhausted by the
disorderly mass of detail. No one is able to resolve great affairs alone, no
matter how much a magistrate might deserve the glories of a kingdom.
Not even if, buried like Enceladus, he should bear steep Etna, or if he
should be buried under the weight of the sky, like great Atlas. He is a
fortunate man who has endured a wretched struggle, and who has not
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succumbed to fear, though buried under the mass of affairs. Give to no-
one, Terminus [god of boundaries], the judgment which is yours alone,
which is to set new limits beyond what is already fixed when too much
has been undertaken. Moderation in private and public affairs was once
golden: how much more golden an age than this of iron? It will be advan-
tageous to divide those things that the beautiful order separates. Having
considered these public matters at Caius College, Crisp [unidentified]
advised me to remind the masters of affairs and princes of this. And in-
deed, I believe it; what harm will it do to remember? (Sig. P3v)
What is so suggestive about Harvey’s copy of Essayes is the interlinking of literary and
political counsel. The king we discover in its margins does not expound the “reulis” of
poetry; rather, he is engaged, on this view, in a broader debate about the development
of the vernacular and conduct of association in ways that Harvey and Buchanan would
recognize. The king who can write so conventionally, on this view, is also likely to heed
the advice in the poem “On the republic to be established.”
Harvey’s marginalia in Essayes enables us to expand the significance of marginal
annotation, a form that can both express a political ideal of association and put it into
practice. It prompts us to reconsider not just the reception of writings that crossed
the border at Berwick but also how the border at the edge of a page might be used to
conceive a boundary to royal dominion. Attending to this fragmentary, sometimes
fugitive, mode of writing illuminates another place in which Elizabethan humanists
demonstrate that the boundary between thinking like a citizen and thinking like a
subject was provisional rather than absolute.
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De Republica Ordinanda. Ad summos Aulae, Urbis, provinciarumque magistratus:
Curas partiri communes arte decenti,
Nec Legum immemores, nec morum, aut ordinis esse,
Et fascem cuiusq[ue] grauem ratione leuare,
Ne procurantes confusa mole fatiscant,
Aut hos, aut illos nimiumue, parumue molestet,
Propria nostrorum fortè est medicina malorum.
Quæ nemo potis est solus componere tanta,
Quantuscunq[ue] magistratus meret inclyta regni.
Non si humeris, velùt Enceladus, ferat arduus Ætna[m],
Aut coeli subeat pondus, magni instar Atlantis.
Foelix, qui miserum tolerans superauit agonem,
Nec spe succubuit, pænè obrutus aggere rerum.
Nam cedo nulli, tua sola est, Termine, gnoma:
Plusq[ue] vltrà, nimis effusum, defixa coercet.
Ille modus rerum priuatus, publicus, olim
Aureus, hoc ferri, quantò magis aureus aeuo?
Diuidere intererit, quæ pulcher segregat ordo.
Talia apud Caium meditatus publica Crispus
Me monuit, rerum dominos, Proceresq[ue] monere,
Credo equidem, memores: sed quid memorare nocebit?
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